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NEWS BRIEFS 
ENTERING CLASS — From over 1,200 applica-
tions, 179 students were registered at Marshall-Wythe 
on September 9, 1971. Associate Dean John E. Donald-
son reports that this represents a 60% increase in ap-
plications as compared with a projected national 
rise of 40% this year. The entering class is divided 
almost equally between Virginia and out-of-state 
residents. Academically the class has a grade point 
average of 1.8 on a 3-point scale and a mean LSAT 
of approximately 604. 
FACULTY RECOGNIZED — Two Marshall-
Wythe faculty members have been honored national-
ly as "Outstanding Educators of America" this year. 
Professor Arthur W. Phelps has authored scholarly 
texts in the field of Virginia procedure, evidence, 
and domestic law. Associate Professor Robert E. Scott 
has made notable achievements in just three years 
as an instructor and as Faculty Co-advisor to the 
William and Mary Law Review. The "Outstanding 
Educators of America" is an annual program to 
recognize outstanding leadership and achievement 
in the field of education. 
NEW LAW BUILDING — Dean James P. Whyte 
states that the law school has submitted a request 
for planning money for a new low building. The funds 
would meet architectural and engineering fees for a 
proposed building. The results of this budget request 
should be available from the Virginia General Assem-
bly sometime in April of 1972. 
LSD-ABA- 
Rich Ashman, third year law student, was recently 
elected Vice-President of the Notional Student Bar 
Association. 
Ashman was elected July 5 at the annual meeting 
in New York City over candidates from the University 
of Michigan and the University of Oklahoma. 
The session was attended by over 300 delegates 
from 90 law schools 
Ashman will administer the law school services 
fund of $20,000 which is a matching fund program 
for local chapters working on various projects. 
William & Mary was also honored by receiving the 
"Recognition Award" granted to schools with a stu-
dent bar membership of 75%. The award was granted 
to only seven schools in the nation. 
Additional representatives from Marshall-Wythe 
included Tom Revely, Ron Burgess and Allan Enderly-
President of the local student bar. 
FOR YOUR THOUGHT 
AND INFORMATION 
This is an open column where the reader may ex-
press any of those fleeting thoughts of brilliance 
which we all have at one time or another. Address 
your thoughts or information to: Colonial Lawyer, 
Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William 
and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia, 23185. Please 
be as concise as possible. 
• * * 
We have four law schools in Virginia. The following 
is a breakdown of population and number of courses 
available. 
Students Courses Seminars 
Marshall-Wythe 400 46 6 
Washington and Lee 200 53 0 
University of Virginia 750 101 40 
T. C. Williams (Richmond) 200 38 0 
• • • • • 
Effective July 1, 1971, Virginia's new constitution 
includes many changes which we hope to report on at 
a later date. Among the most needed was a reference 
to the right of the people to a clean environment. We 
quote from Article XI Sec. 1: "To the end that the 
people have clean air, pure water, and the use and 
enjoyment for the recreation of adequate public lands; 
waters, and other natural resources, it shall be the 
policy of the Commonwealth to conserve, develop, 
and utilize its natural resources, its public lands and 
its historical sites and buildings. Further it shall be 
the Commonwealth's policy to protect its atmosphere, 
lands and waters from pollution, impairment, or de-
struction for the benefit, enjoyment and general wel-
fare of the people of the Commonwealth. 
* • • * • 
Florida has recently passed a new set of divorce 
laws, often referred to as "No-Fault Divorce." Under 
this new system the court is only required to find the 
relationship "irretrieveably broken." Also, Men's 
Liberation has struck a blow for freedom as the hus-
band will receive equal consideration for custody of 
the children and alimony. Perhaps it is about time 
for Virginia to reconsider its divorce laws. 
If you really want to stop prostitution, simply ar-
rest both parties, after all, as my mother always said, 
"It takes two . . . " 
• • * • • 
Public utilities are supposed to exist for the benefit 
of the people, but somehow, after about the third 
rate increase, one begins to believe that the utility 
officials have justified on existence independent of 
the public. As a restraint that is due the public, the 
State Corporation Commission (who rules on the rate 
increase) should have access to the utilities financial 
records and make their results available to the public 
. . . anytime they seek a rote increase. 
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"BY THE PEOPLE . " 
Virginia . Election Law 
— E. Powell 
The root of the governments by and with which the 
people of the United States live is the ballot. Year by 
year, by machine or paper ballot, the citizens of all 
the electoral units of the nation select those individ-
uals who, at least in theory, will serve them in thou-
sands of capacities, both small and great. 
The process by which the government is chosen is 
delineated in each state by the legislatures. In its 
last session, the legislature of Virginia substantially 
revised and tightened the election law of that juris-
diction. 
Virginia, like many of her sister states, has had 
to deal with both the elimination of election frauds 
and on increasing voting population, which is not 
only more numerous, but more mobile. The legislature 
has taken steps to correct the problems in both these 
areas. 
One of the greatest invitations to abuse in any 
election is the casting of absentee ballots. "Black 
satchelling" these ballots has been a known practice 
in some areas of the state. The worker with the black 
satchel approaches the voter, provides him with an 
application for an absentee ballot, or the ballot itself, 
sees how it is voted, and then makes sure it is returned. 
If the worker is buying votes, it is his greatest insur-
ance that he gets what he pays for. If he simply wishes 
to insure that "his people" are doing right by old 
State Senator Whatever, he achieved that goal as well. 
The black satchel destroys the secret ballot. 
The new Virginia law makes real inroads on such 
practices. First, only those with a bona fide reason 
for being physically unable to reach the polls on elec-
tion day may cost on absentee ballot by mail. This 
category includes the ill or physically handicapped, 
military personnel on active duty, business persons 
who are regularly employed outside the United States, 
such as the merchant marine, and students and their 
spouses who are away from their regular residence. 
Those voters who ore absent from the district on 
election day because of business or vocation or other 
personal reasons must appear in person at the office 
of the registrar and cast their ballots before that 
officer. This in person requirement not only simplifies 
the administrative procedure, but, if enforced, should 
help to eliminate problems of absentee vote fraud. 
Tombstone voting, and its relatives, takes a serious 
blow with the institution of a mandatory automatic 
purge of the Virginia voting lists, As of December 31, 
1974, and annually thereafter, the name of any voter 
who has not voted at least once during four consecu-
tive calendar years will be purged by the general 
registrar. This annual automatic purge is badly needed 
in areas' like Tidewater. and Northern Virginia where 
the transient population is large. As families move to 
another state, they may re-register without notifying 
the Virginia registrar. Those "Deadwood" names re-
main on the lists, an open invitation to fraud. In a 
recent Charlottesville election, won by one vote, party 
members checking the rolls found that a woman, born 
in 1840, had voted in 1970. She did not come forward 
to have her picture taken for the news media. 
Until this time, voter registration rolls have been 
held by local electoral boards and registrars, with 
little state supervision. Under the new law, by Octo-
ber 1, 1973, the State Board of Elections is to set up 
a computerized central registration system. 
With this in mind, social security numbers are be-
ing collected throughout the state. The process of 
guaranteeing that no person is registered in each of 
several neighboring electoral units has been extreme-
ly inefficient, and a laborious process for election 
officials and voters alike. The computer system should 
ease the strain. 
Virginia's new law also moves toward recognizing 
the mobile voter by reducing the residence require-
ments for registration. Under the old low, a citizen 
had to be a resident of the state for one year, the 
city or county for six months, and the precinct for 
thirty days. The new law specifies six months in the 
state, and thirty days in the precinct. There are also 
special provisions for presidential elections where the 
citizen leaves the state during the thirty days prior 
to the election. (The voter may return and vote only 
for presidential electors.) 
An important change has been made for the mili-
tary population. Under the old law, a military person 
did not have to appear to register to vote. He could 
appear at the polls, sign an affadavit of residence, 
and then cast his ballot. The new law requires all , 
military personnel to register, although military cast-
ing absentee ballots may also register by mail. 
Because it is far easier to tamper with paper bal-
lots, citizens will be pleased to note that Virginia now 
requires most localities to acquire voting machines, 
with 1976 as the cut-off date for all precincts having 
more than 500 registered voters. 
Students of election laws will notice many other 
small but important changes in Virginia's rules. Some 
improvements appear only in instructions issued for 
the State Board of Elections. This brief review can 
only note the major changes. However, the people of 
Virginia are to be commended for their efforts to 
bring their electoriol process into the twentieth cen-
tury. A major step has been taken. 
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into smaller, edible bits by the yeast and bacteria of 
the marsh. This forms a vast food base for insects, 
fish, shrimp, crab, oysters, clams, etc., which in turn 
form a food base for larger creatures, including man. 
THE WETLANDS: 
Value of the Wetlands 
Earth's Precious 
Reservoir of Life 
How much do they weigh on Equities 
balance of economics v. ecology 
David Favre 
Virginia has 5,432 miles of shoreline, which in-
cludes 196 miles of sand, 472 miles of residential or 
industrial development, 2,045 miles of dry shore, and 
2,719 miles of marsh. While almost everyone is fa-
miliar with the sand beaches and dry shores, few 
understand the role that marshes play in the coastal 
environment. The purpose of this article is to give the 
reader a broad understanding of what the marsh and 
wetlands are, their value, and to introduce some of 
the legal problems involved with protecting the marsh. 
In both conversion of sunlight to plant food and 
support of a vast variety of animal life, the marsh-
land is one of the most productive environments found 
in nature. It also forms buffer zones between salt-
water tides, freshwater, and dry land. Although there 
is some dispute as to what legally and biologically 
constitutes a wetland, it is generally agreed to be that 
land found between the average high and low water 
marks of any tidal action. While this is certainly the 
heart of the marsh, there are also lands above and 
below this elevation which are an integral part of the 
ecology. 
The marsh is normally a large flat area which re-
ceives a continuous daily wash of nutrients and sedi-
ment from the sea (which acts to suppress "algae 
bloom," such as red tides) and the fresh water streams. 
In this bed of nutrients, many plants unique to marsh-
land provide food, shelter, and nesting grounds for 
thousands of birds and wild animals. It has been esti-
mated by the Virginia Institute of Marine Science 
that the production of the Virginia Marsh varies from 
three to ten tons per acre per year (wheat yields 1.5 
tons and the best hay lands 4 tons). The largest value 
of these plants is after they have been broken down 
For many people, the value of the wetlands lies in 
their potential for a housing development or indus- 
trial site. In opposition to this school of thought there 
have been several attempts to give a monetary value 
to the marsh, but knowledge of the interaction of the 
living web is so primative that estimates hove varied 
from $78 to $525 per acre per year. 
Some of the products that come directly from the 
marsh include oysters, clams, shrimp, a variety of 
waterfowl and the pelts of mink, otter, muskrat, and 
raccoon. In Virginia alone, several million dollars 
were spent last year by people participating in salt-
water fishing and the hunting of waterfowl. It has 
been estimated that 80% of the saltwater fish, caught 
either commercially or by sportsmen, spend some 
critical port of their lives in the marsh environment, 
and, of course, without the marsh, the waterfowl could 
not exist. 
Over and above the actual dollar return of these 
lands, however, we must realize that it is impossible 
to give a monetary value for much of the marsh. It 
is difficult, for example, to put a price on peace and 
quiet, marred only now and then by the call of exotic 
birds. Who can say what it is worth to watch a white 
egret, not in a zoo, but stalking through its native 
habitat? Also, how does one put a dollar value on the 
role the marsh plays in keeping the salt water away 
from high ground or its ability to absorb flood waters? 
Legal Problems 
Perhaps the largest problem in protecting Virginia's 
wetlands lies in determining who owns them. In many 
other states this poses no problem as the state has 
consistently claimed control of waterways up to the 
high tide mark. This is also true of the Federal gov-
ernment which claims regulatory powers over navi-
gable waterways up to the high tide mark. But in the 
beginning of Virginia's history there were a number 
of land grants from both the London Company and 
the Crown which made vague reference to the shore 
boundary and, in 1819, the Virginia Legislature passed 
a statute making the boundary of privately owned 
lands at the average low tide mark. In 1904, the Vir-
ginia courts declared that riparian land owners had 
several "rights," including: A) a "right of way" from 
their property to navigable water, B) the right to 
build private piers or wharfs subject to state regula-
tion, C) the right to claim, in fee, land formed by 
accretion or alluvium, and D) to make reasonable 
use of water flowing past their land. 
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All of this amounted in reality to no limitation of a 
property owners use of his land. Recently the state 
has required that before a person can commercially 
develop property in tidal areas, he must acquire a per-
mit from the Marine Resources Committee. However, 
this committee is not empowered to save the wetlands, 
only to control pollution of the waters by that which is 
built on the destroyed wetlands. 
If it is conceded that Virginia land owners have a 
property interest in the wetlands (it could be argued 
Perhaps the largest problem in protecting 
Virginia's Wetlands lies in determining what 
constitutes a Wetland. 
that their interest is that of a mere licensee, revocable 
at will by the legislature), then how can the state con-
trol the private use of them? Inherent in the concept 
of the State is that of Police power, which would in-
clude the power to regulate the use of land for the 
good of the public. This has been practiced for many 
years by the use of zoning, but even where land is 
zoned the owner is allowed some type of development 
upon it. However, the wetlands can tolerate no com-
mercial development. They must remain as nature 
built them. Thus, if a certain areas has been deter-
mined to be necessary for the ecological balance of 
the coastal estuary, the state will have to refuse the 
request of any owner therein for any type of commer-
cial or private development; even a simple road may 
seriously harm a marsh.area. 
Now the question arises: does this constitute the 
taking of land by the state without just compensation? 
Since this is a strong possibility and most will admit 
that the brunt of burden of a wetlands statute will be 
born by the individual land owner, it would only seem 
fair that the state be capable of giving financial 
relief to the riparian owner. To accomplish this there 
are several possibilities: A) the agency charged with 
protection of the wetlands could also have the power 
to eminent domain, B) the state agency could be al-
lowed to purchase easements of wetlands where pur-
chase of the land is prohibitive, and C) there could 
be a reduction of property tax for those owners willing 
to retain their land in its natural state. 
Conclusion 
At this time, Virginia is the only state on the east-
ern seaboard without any type of protection for the 
wetlands. The Corps of Engineers is currently doing a 
much better job of protecting our wetlands than we 
ore. The necessity exists. May the next session of the 
Legislature see a statute passed which will allow us to 
do the job properly. 
There were three basic sources for this article, 
all of which I would highly recommend to anyone 
interested in the subject: CHESAPEAKE BAY IN 
LEGAL PERSPECTIVE, by Professor Garrett 
Power of the University of Maryland Law School 
(Dept. of the Interior, March, 1970), LIFE AND 
DEATH OF THE SALT MARSH, by John and 
Mildred Teal, Ballantine paperback, and finally, 
COASTAL WETLANDS OF VIRGINIA, a report 
put out by the Virginia Institute of Marine Science, 
(December, 1969). 
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CURRICULUM REVIEW 
—BRIAN BROMBERGER 
The growth and expansion of the Marshall-Wythe 
School of Law has brought with it many of the diffi-
culties which confront other law schools throughout 
the world, not the least of which is how and what to 
teach. These difficulties arise because the aims ; -am-
bitions and backgrounds of the students become more 
varied as their numbers increase and because there 
is the desire on behalf of most legal academics to 
meet these aims and ambitions within the framework 
of the law school. At the same time it must be noted 
that within the law teaching profession, there are 
variations in ideas as to the function of a law school. 
There are those who see a law school as an institution 
for the training of people for the practice of law and 
there are those who believe that the function of the 
law school is multi-purposed and any curriculum must 
be designed to meet many requirements. The follow-
ing takes the second view as given and is only de-
signed to suggest some problems and ideas in on ad-
mitted incomplete manner, which I believe arise out 
of this concept. 
If there is to be an analysis or evaluation or pro-
jection of any law school curriculum, it is necessary 
to begin with the initial premise that nothing is 
sacrosanct; not the three-year law school, not the 
first-year curriculum, not the course divisions or the 
casebooks that we, as teachers, know and respect. If 
a projection for the future is to be meaningful, new 
and old teachers alike must be prepared to face the 
fact that what we have been teaching and what we 
would like to teach may not, in fact, be terribly sig-
nificant in on ideal scheme of legal education. This 
means that we must be prepared to spend a consider-
able amount of time deciding why we teach the courses 
we do and in the manner we do. 
Why do we teach torts, or contracts, or property 
as separate courses, and why in the first year? Why 
do we teach consideration in contracts, or Adams • 
Lindsell? At each of these levels of abstraction, we 
must justify what we are teaching to ourselves, to our 
colleagues and to our students. 
It may turn out that most of what we presently do 
will merit retention, but if this occurs it will be by 
coincidence and if any curriculum study is to be  
worthwhile, we, as teachers, must be prepared to 
sacrifice some very familiar life patterns. 
The fundamental question is: Who are we trying 
to educate? The substantial changes which have oc-
cured at law schools across the country makes the 
answer to this question almost impossible. We have 
only the remotest idea of what kinds of jobs our 
future graduates will hold down during their profes-
sional careers. We do know that the change in the 
composition of this law school will mean that the 
interests and career plans of the students will be far 
more diverse than they were twenty years ago. It is 
our job then, to reassess what we are trying to teach 
our graduates to be. It is possible at this stage to 
introduce some categories. There will be the general 
practitioner who we are training to be able to handle 
a typical small office with its wide range of typical 
problems presented by typical individual clients. There 
will be the specialist practitioner, who will move into 
a larger firm and spend most of his time drafting wills, 
creating and dissolving charitable corporations, nego-
tiating labor contracts or transferring real property. 
There will be the policymaker in business and legisla-
ture. There will be the scholars who are interested in 
the workings of the legal process as a means of solving 
society's problems and analyzing its structure and 
development. Lastly (for the purpose of this paper), 
we are simply training people to be better able to 
understand events because of their exposure to prob-
lems of government and lawmaking in all its forms. 
It is the prototype of the type of person we are try-
ing to turn out from law school that must determine 
the content of the law course which we offer. 
I would suggest that no matter into which group 
an individual student placed himself, there would be 
some common thread in his legal education. Each 
student must be given an introduction to the legal 
process, the various institutions created by society to 
resolve its disputes, and should also be given training 
in "thinking like a lawyer." This would include re-
spect for facts, ability to analyze and synthesize 
cases and an habitual skepticism toward undocu-
mented assertions and generalizations. It is suggested 
that this can be quite adequately carried out in the 
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first year of law school and from thereon the paths of 
our prototypes would diverge, but nevertheless, it must 
be remembered that the law school is training lawyers. 
The determination of what makes a lawyer discernibly 
different from the political scientist will largely dic-
tate the way in which these divergent paths are trod-
den. It has been suggested that a lawyer possesses a 
particular attitude toward the handling of facts given 
to him by others and if we can discover any other 
attributes which we want to cultivate, we can under-
stand better what it is we wont to teach and how we 
should do it. 
WHY THE THREE YEAR LAW SCHOOL? 
Almost fifty years ago the American Association 
of Law Schools wrote the three year law school into 
'law' and made it the basis of its system of accredita-
tion. The A.A.L.S. also required that each student 
must hove the equivalent of two years of college 
prior to his admission into law school. It is worth 
noting that until well into the 1930's, most law schools 
were accepting students who had only obtained a 
high school diploma. In this context the three year 
law school takes on an entirely different hue. Today, 
of course, things are vastly different. Students come 
to law school with four years of college training and 
many come with advanced academic degrees. The 
construction of the three year format cannot be justi-
fied by the same reasons that existed fifty years ago. 
If we try to justify the three year program on the 
basis of the introduction of new fields of law, then 
if 
. . New and old teachers alike must be 
prepared to face the fact that what we have 
been teaching and what we would like to 
teach may not, in fact, be terribly significate 
in an ideal scheme of legal education." 
new questions become apparent. Why must we teach 
every law student these recently evolved subjects and, 
if these subjects are evolving so, rapidly, is it realistic 
to believe that that which we teach now will be of 
value in five years time? It may be that the present 
justification for the three year course is purely prag-
matic. The third year helps finance the enterprise; 
if we abandon it we would lose our A.A.L.S. accredi-
tation, and our student bar admission in practically 
every state would be in jeopardy. 
WHY THE PRESENT FIRST YEAR STRUCTURE? 
Langdell believed that the subject matter of our 
familiar first year curriculum was basic to the science 
of low. Now, more than seventy-five years later, we 
have substantially the some curriculum. [it should 
be noted here that the introduction of the Adminis- 
Professor Bromberger is a new addition to the Marshall-Wythe 
Faculty. Having taught previously in Australia where he was born, 
he has been in the U. S. only three years, one of which was as a 
professor at the University of Pennsylvania. 
trative Law and Legislation course in 1971 at this 
law school shows a moving away from this philosophy."' 
It is suggested however, that the subject matter 
is really only the vehicle which carries the purposes 
of the first year program. During his first year the 
student should be made familiar with legal institu-
tions — their purposes, methods, limitation and de-
velopment. It has been long accepted that an inten-
sive consideration of one institution, the judiciary, 
was preferable to that of a rounded picture of them 
all — judicial, legislative and executive, The inade-
quacy of the former is especially true today when 
more and more law is being created by the legislative 
and executive-administrative branches of govern-
ment. The first year should include skill training. 
Traditionally, the emphasis has been upon the skills 
of case analysis, but should we not at least try to 
introduce other lawyer-like skills? We can only 
justify our exclusive diet of case analysis, if it 
is indeed the most fundamental, and takes two 
semester, in all first year courses to complete. 
This assumption is at best doubtful. Would it not be 
more economical to use a part of the first year pro-
gram, maybe two or three courses, for this purpose 
thus creating time for a concentration in other skills. 
It is not suggested that the other courses should total-
ly ignore it, but rather de-emphasize it and thus give 
a more accurate picture of what it really means to 
"think like a lawyer." Training in lawyer-like skills 
and acquaintance with different legal institutions can 
be carried out by selecting from an enormous number 
of courses. What makes a particular subject matter 
especially appropriate for inclusion in a first year 
curriculum? The subject matter is especially appro-
priate for instruction in a particular skill or institu-
tion, (e. g, in civil procedure, the historical emergence 
of the equity court and equitable remedies.) The sub- 
(Continued on Page 12) 
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SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 
RECONSTRUCTION REVISITED, OR 
A RAWER OF BLACK AND WHITE 
-NATALIE C. GILLETTE 
The current legal struggle over public school inte-
gration began with Brown seventeen years ago. The 
Supreme Court found that "separate educational fa-
cilities are inherently unequal.' They said that since 
the state undertakes to provide education for all 
children it must provide it to all on equal terms. Even 
though the "tangible" factors may be equal, segrega-
tion of blacks "solely because of their race generates 
a feeling of inferiority . . . that may affect their hearts 
and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone," and 
that the "sense of inferiority affects the motivation 
of the child to learn." 
As the subsequent history has shown, the Brown 
decision left many questions unanswered. The only 
mention of de jure, as opposed to de facto, segrega-
tion came in a quote from the lower court, which had 
said that segregation "with the sanction of law" was 
of greater psychological harm than that without.' 
The Supreme Court itself spoke only of the inherent 
unconstitutionality of segregation and the necessity 
for its elimination with 'all deliberate speed." 
Most of the other difficulties that have plagued 
school integration were foreshadowed in Brown as 
well. The lower courts were ordered to appraise 
school board plans and to retainjurisdiction until a 
workable plan was put into effect. The burden to show 
good faith compliance was put on defendant school 
boards. The courts in their appraisals of plans were to 
consider the physical condition of the school plant, 
the transportation system, personnel, revision of at-
tendance zones and school districts, and local laws 
and regulations. The unconstitutional discrimination 
was to cease; but the law had embarked on one more 
treacherous quagmire of definition, and the Pandora's 
box of methods was opened wide. 
Busing 
Recent cases are in agreement on one vital point. 
The time for deliberate speed has passed; integration 
is required now.' Most other questions, including 
how to accomplish desegregation, remain in conflict. 
The one criterion consistently applied has been simp-
ly, "Does it work?,"' but some courts have refused 
to make this their prime consideration. ' 
. . . "Despite the current furor over busing, 
the methods of integration raise far less 
important legal questions than the defini-
tion of what, exactly, is unconstitutional..." 
The most controversial method urged has been 
busing. Some courts have refused to order busing to 
achieve integration even when no other method was 
possible.' The anti-busing provision of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964' has been largely ignored. One court re-
cently construed that statute as refusing any new 
power to the courts, but not as precluding their order-
ing desegregation plans which happen to include 
busing. Other courts have ordered busing plans with-
out reference to the statute, including the Eastern Dis-
trict of. Virginia." 
The Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Swann" 
supports these orders. The Swann decision's strong 
call for elimination of all vestiges of stote-imposed 
segregation in public education plus its statement that 
busing is not unreasonable can be construed as a 
mandate that busing be ordered when necessary to 
eliminate vestigial segregation. 
While Nixon's recent statements opposing busing 
may reduce the vigor of H.E.W.'s insistence on busing 
plans, the courts are less likely to bow to the Presi-
dent's wishes. Even if Nixon acceded to the demon-
strators' demands to order an end to busing for inte-
gration purposes, which is highly unlikely, black par-
ents would doubtless bring new court actions, and 
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courts would make the some kinds of orders they have 
been making. Faced with a choice between contempt 
of court and disobedience of Nixon, school boards 
would obey court orders, since the President could not 
enforce his order effectively and the courts can. 
Nixon's views and Governor Wallace's proposed legis-
lation in Alabama may delay integration by busing, 
but are not likely to stop it. A constitutional amend-
ment could of course, but seems unlikely to be 
adopted. In any event, integration and busing need 
not, in most cases, rise or fall together. Redrawing 
school districts, for example, can have the same effect 
De Jure and De Facto 
Despite the current furor over busing, the methods 
of integration raise far less important legal questions 
than the definition of what, exactly, is unconstitu-
tional. No one yet has answered the question clearly 
for de facto segregation. If all-black schools are in-
herently unequal, is public support of an all-black 
school discriminatory state action in itself? If not, 
... is it not time for the law to admit that 
an all-white school can be perfectly con-
stitutional but that an all-black school de-
nies equal protection of the laws. . ." 
what activities of state and local governments — such 
as residential zoning, placement of public assistance 
housing, and site choices for schools — are to be 
considered legal causes of segregated schools? 
The, Supreme Court relied on psychological evi- 
dence in finding that segregated schools are inher- 
ently unequal." Psychologists, despite the Court's sug-
gestion that de jure is worse than de facto segrega-
tion, agree that segregation impairs self-esteem and 
motivation to learn no matter what its cause." Some 
courts have adopted that finding." Most often, how-
ever, the law insists on finding some state action be-
yond the fact of all-block schools." 
In a recent Virginia case, the court saw differing 
requirements directed to formerly de jure segregated 
schools and those segregated only de facto: there is a 
negative mandate to the Jotter to end "effective ex-
clusion" of blacks from white schools, while the form-
er have an affirmative duty to correct the segregation 
caused by earlier statutes." The suggestion seems 
to be that where state action causing segregation was 
overt, the state must act to integrate the resulting 
all-block schools, but where it was and is more subtle, 
the state must only cease its discriminatory policies. 
The idea seems at best to be very odd. One could 
easily argue that the result would be an unlawful dis-
crimination against the southern states, and our 
country's reconstruction policy is, hopefully, a thing 
of the distant past. 
The Supreme Court's Swann decision does not settle 
the question." The opinion does clearly state that 
one-race school's are not per se unconstitutional, but 
it is not at all clear what constitutes state action. De-
liberately maintained "dual school systems" may re-
quire "awkward, inconvenient and even bizarre" 
remedies, but once the damage is undone there may well 
be no further need for legal measures to enforce inte-
gration. On the other hand, the Court expressly de-
clined to decide whether or not other state action than 
that of school boards can create unconstitutional 
segregation. If school board action is state action, as 
the latter clearly implies, then the Court has not said 
that only states where segregation was once required 
by law are now obliged to integrate the schools, despite 
the equally clear implication to the contrary in the 
former statement. 
The executive branch of our government, in the 
form of the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare, has attempted to fill the gap from another 
direction." So has Congress." Both provided that no 
federal financial aid would be given to any program 
or activity that discriminates on the basis of race. 
Both clearly apply to schools everywhere in the coun-
try, but they are still not as much help as might be 
expected. Neither the statute, which the courts, of 
course, must follow, nor the non-binding guidelines 
define discrimination, but, as usual, leave that task 
to the courts, and the courts are for from any consen-
sus. 
In Congress last spring, Senator Ribicoff proposed 
establishment of a time-table and suggested methods 
for metropolitan integration," but he .labelled his pro-
posal a "policy," and, even if it is passed, it is un-
likely to be more definitive than current law. 
The school boards have not done well at taking the 
initiative required of them by Brown." Judicial review 
of each case on its own merits presents many diffi-
culties. When school board plans are inadequate, the 
court must retain jurisdiction and rule on the next 
plan the board devises, a process which can continue 
for years, and, when a case is appealed, it is some-
times too late to enforce a specific ruling for a spe-
cific school year. At least one court has concluded, 
despite the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the H.E.W. 
(Continued on Page 13) 
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BOOK REVIEW - 
"WOODMAN SPARE THAT TREE . . ." 
—by E. Powell 
Defending the Environment — A Strategy for Citizen 
Action. Joseph L Sax. Knopf, N.Y. 1971, h.b. 
$6.95. 
After you have read all the books on the news stand 
that say all those things about pesticides and sewage, 
litter and eutrophocotion, and you begin to watch the 
world deteriorate around you from your bicycle seta—
this book is where the action is. The title is deceptive; 
the book is more a suggestion of a remedy than strat-
egy, more analysis of the reasons for citizen impotence 
than a setting forth of things to do while you wait 
for the bulldozers. 
The author, Joseph Sax, is a Professor of Law at 
the University of Michigan, who is working to revise 
the law of envioronmental protection. Specifically, 
he has written a law which establishes court actions 
for citizens by which plans for buildings, highways, 
airports, etc. can be remanded to the legislature, en-
joined, or subjected to a moratorium by court order. 
Sax is not alone in his mistrust of administrative 
agencies, but he may be alone in his approach to that 
mistrust. No agency, by Sax's standards, can truly 
defend "the public interest." Agencies are cumber-
some, subject to political pressures, victims of the 
'insider perspective.' Agencies make strings of excep- 
tions to rules until the rules themselves have disap-
peared. 
Sax sees the courts as the only place sufficiently 
objective to truly defend the environment, and the 
initiative of the private citizen the best repository of 
the "public trust." It would be hard not to agree. 
The case is made in the opening pages of the book 
by a detailed report of the fight to save a part of the 
Potomac estuary called Hunting Creek. Before the 
reader's eyes, Senator's aides, Congressmen, and 
Governor's of Virginia wind a dance around bureau-
crats watching their own interests and the media. A 
famous wildlife reporter and a little old lady on the 
telephone, hearings, the whole gamut of pro and anti 
forces pick and ramble through years of decision. It 
would be unfair to announce the winning side in this 
review, and perhaps it would be impossible. 
The State of Michigan has adopted Sax's law. Its 
passage has been noted approvingly by such giant's 
of the media as the Wall Street Journal, and The New 
Yorker. It seems that other legislatures should care-
fully consider the citizen's remedies in their states, 
and the passage of the same or similar legislation. 
The case is well-made, the book is readable, if 
somewhat repetitious. It should be on the reading, 
list of all ecology buffs. 
Senate 
I. Voting Rights Amendment — to lower voting 
age to 18; adopted 64-17. 
2. Nomination of G. Harrold Carswell; rejected 
45-51. 
3. McGovern-Hatfield Amendment — limiting the 
number of troops in Viet Nam after April 1, 
1971; rejected 39-55. 
4. Amendment deleting funds for the SST from 
budget; adopted 52-41. 
5. Vote to table the "Home Rule" amendment for 
Washington, D.C.; adopted 68-23. 
6. Resolution proposing the Constitutional Amend-
ment to lower the voting age to 18; adopted 94-0. 
7. Amendment to extend the draft for one year 
instead of two; rejected 43-49. 
8. Amendment to Draft Bill declaring that it should 
be the U.S. policy to leave Viet Nam at the 
earliest possible date—within 9 months of enact-
ment, subject to release of all POWs; adopted 
61-38. 
9. Emergency Public Service Employment Act, $2.25 
Billion; adopted 75-11. 
10. Amendment deleting the space shuttle program 
and other reductions in NASA budget; rejected 
22-64. 
11. Amendment to limit the subsidies of farmers to 
$20,000, except for wool or sugar; rejected 29-56. 
12. Amendment to increase funds for school lunch 
program by $16.9 Billion; adopted 56-28. 
(Continued on Page 12) 
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ject matter is such that it presents certain concepts 
which are so fundamental that an educated lawyer 
must have on acquaitntance with them (e.g. proxi-
mate cause, reasonable man). The subject matter 
affords a suitable starting point for more advanced 
courses in later years. The subject matter is exciting 
or easy to grasp and acts as a source to an otherwise 
strange and difficult and sometimes dull bill of fare. 
With these facts in mind, various aspects of vari-
ous courses lose their significance. Con we explain 
the usual presence in contracts of public reward of-
fers, offers which lapse or are subconsciously revoked 
or cross in the moil, or the supposed Constable which 
turns out to be a tenth grader's examination project, 
on the basis that they provide the student with a 
better way of learning to "think like a lawyer" than 
would a dozen other conceivable first year courses. 
It is quite possible that this approach would result in 
the first year curriculum looking very little like the 
way it does at the moment. Some courses which have 
traditionally been second and third year electives 
might leap to the fore as being eminently suitable for 
a first year course. An example of this could be a 
course in Family Law. 
FAMILY LAW 
The Family Law course would uniquely expose the 
student to a range of problems otherwise wholly ig-
nored in the typical first-year curriculum. First, it 
offers the opportunity to examine the relationship be-
tween the individual and the state in an area of special 
sensitivity and interest: the individual as he relates 
to those within the family unit. The problems ore 
thus quite distinct from the usual problems of govern-
ment regulation in the more commonly explored ex-
amples of the accused criminal or the interstate busi-
ness. Second, the law is developing afresh at the 
intersection of family law and constitutional law. The 
course provides an excellent vehicle for extrapolating 
the doctrines of due process, equal protection and the 
like — into such problems as illegitimacy, privacy, 
custody and welfare. Third, the course is also a natur-
al vehicle for the introduction of learning from the 
behavioral sciences, not only psychiatry but also 
sociology, criminology and economics. Fourth, and 
related, the types of written materials with which the 
students will deal can more readily diverge from the 
usual judicial fare, so as to include, for example, 
transcripts of proceedings and interviews, evaluations 
by psychiatrists, source material in the behavioral 
sciences. Fifth, the course affords an opportunity for 
a special kind of skill-training which the law school 
has notoriously neglected (at least as required learn-
ing): interviewing and counseling. It appears undeni-
able that not only are these activities ones in which 
the lawyer will be engaged, but they are also in them-
selves worthy of investigation and analysis as part of 
the process of learning about the legal profession and 
the legal system. Sixth, the student is forced to ex-
amine certain basic assumptions about the role of 
lawyers and the viability of the adversary system in 
solving what is classified as a "legal" problem but 
which obviously has broader social and scientific im-
plications. Seventh, the course offers an unusual op-
portunity to explore problems of legal ethics. Eighth, 
the subject matter of the course is much more likely  
than most traditional courses to evoke an emotional 
response on the part of the student, since many of 
the problems have moral overtones and many indeed 
are problems which actually have touched the lives 
of our students. It is valuable for the student to have 
these emotional responses confronted and channelized 
within the broader framework of reason and of legal 
institutions. 
A course in family law has some drawbacks. I doubt 
that the subject matter itself is so fundamental and 
pervasive that it con be said to be an indispensible 
part of every lawyer's intellectual training. There is 
also a risk in offering such a course in the first year—
where the great emphasis is otherwise upon rigorous 
case analysis — that students will take less seriously 
any course in which that type of analysis ploys a 
relatively small role. While that risk cannot be elimi-
nated altogether, it is likely to be minimized by the 
existence of other first-year courses which depart 
somewhat from an exclusive emphasis on case ma-
terials. This is not intended to be a plea for the intro-
duction of Family Law into the first year curriculum 
(although it may indeed be suitable). Family Law is 
only used here to show the need for continued and 
continual reappraisial of the offerings of a typical 
law school so that it provides a legal education that 
is both sound and relevant. 
(Continued from Page 11) 
House 
1. Vote to table the motion instructing the House 
Conference to accept the Senate's rejection of 
SST funds; adopted 216-203. 
2. Amendment to delete SST funds; adopted 216-
203. 
3. Amendment extending draft for 1 year instead 
of 2; rejected 198-200. 
4. Amendment to continue the present two year 
alternative service for Consciencious Objectors 
instead of the proposed three year term; rejected 
132-242. 
5. Revival of SST funds for building of prototype; 
adopted 216-203. 
6. Resolution to stop the railroad strike with a 
13.5% pay increase; passed 264-93. 
7. Welfare Social Security Bill, increasing benefits 
and establishing a national family assistance 
program for incapacitated or unemployable 
adults; passed 288-132. 
8. Amendment setting $20,000 limitation on sub-
sidy payments to farmers, except sugar and wool; 
adopted 214-198. 
9. Bill providing on administrative assistant for 
Chief Justice of U.S.; passed 263-139. 
12 
Integration 	 (Continued from Page 9) 
guidelines, that more help is needed from the execu-
tive and legislative branches of the federal govern-
ment; "the courts acting alone hove failed.' It is 
little wonder, for no one has defined what they are 
required to do. 
Black and White 
There is one distinction which is openly made by 
scientists, but which the law has shied away from. 
Psychologists tell us that all-black schools are in-
jurious to the children who attend them. The law finds 
that separate facilities are inherently unequal. The 
scientists tell us that the white child's education loses 
nothing by his attending an all-white school." The 
courts carefully refer to one-race schools and find no 
inequality per se in such schools. 
Is it not time for the law to admit that on all-white 
school can be perfectly constitutional but that on all-
black school denies equal protection of the laws? The 
law adopted the findings of psychology in 1954; let 
the law now finish the job it has undertaken by ad-
mitting that one-sided harm — unequal protection —
demands remedies only for those harmed. Once the 
law officially recognizes the difference between "one-
race" and "all-black," a definition of what has been 
declared unconstitutional is relatively easy. Until 
then, definition is impossible. 
Every child cannot attend an integrated school. 
There are not enough black children to go around; 
there are too many all-white communities in America. 
It is not impossible, however, to require that every  
black child attend an integrated school, and that is 
all that the facts of inequality demand. 
Conclusions 
There are too many racially mixed school systems 
in this country for the courts or the federal executive 
agencies to pass on the sufficiency of every plan for 
integration that is proposed or put into effect by each 
school board. The courts have borne the burden es-
sentially alone, and they have succeeded amazingly 
well. They cannot finish the job alone. The fourteenth 
amendement is carrying just about all the judicial 
gloss it will support in this area. Cutting off federal 
aid, the only genuine weapon available to the execu-
tive branch of our government, is a negative and un-
certain way to achieve integration. Only Congressional 
action can solve the problem efficiently. 
Congress need not draft a statute telling the school 
boards how to achieve integration. The possible 
methods are well-known, much discussed, and well 
adjudicated. If the courts' mandates to integrate now 
are to have full meaning and effect, Congress must 
pass a clearly specific law requiring nationwide elimi-
nation of identifiably black schools and imposing ef-
fective penalities for school boards that violate the 
requirements. 
The primary problem would be getting such a law 
passed, but a coalition of northern and western liber-
als and southern legislators, who object to the focus 
on segregated public schools only in the South, might 
accomplish it. It is well worth a try, for the all-black 
school, with its demoralizing effects and its uncon-
stitutional inequality, must go. 
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COURT APPOINTED 
COUNSEL 
IN VIRGINIA: 
Genuine Aid to the Indigent? 
Les Bailey 
On June 23, 1971 United States District Judge 
Marvin E. Frankel ordered Norman Thomas released 
from New York's Green Haven State Prison subject to 
being re-tried by the state within thirty days. Repre-
sented by a string of at least five Legal Aid Society 
lawyers, Thomas suffered what Judge Frankel called 
"the most brutal and horrifying kind of isolation, ef-
fectively walled off for months from any genuine as-
sistance by a facade of representation." According to 
Judge Frankel, despite several hand written pleas by 
Thomas to the state court asking for freedom by writ 
of habeas corpus and for assignment of different law-
yers, Thomas' pretrial ordeal was highlighted by the 
failure of Legal Aid Lawyers to either visit him or to 
call witnesses which he requested. (New York Times, 
June 24, 1971.) 
Thomas' ordeal prompts one to ponder the practical 
meaning of a basic Constitutional right of an accused 
. to have the assistance of counsel for his defense 
. . . in all criminal prosecutions . . . ". (U.S. Const. 
amend. VI.) Reflections upon this right in the context 
of the increasing need for competent legal representa-
tion for indigent defendants in criminal prosecutions 
encouraged a series of interviews with members of 
the Williamsburg and York County Bars. This article 
attempts to briefly examine Virginia's response to the 
need for adequate representation for indigent crimi-
nal defendants in the light of a limited number of 
interviews, pertinent statutes, and case law. 
Legal Aid Society, Public Defender, Court Ap-
pointed Counsel: these three characterize the basic 
approaches to providing counsel in this country for 
those facing criminal charges who are financially 
unable to retain private counsel. (Monson, The Indi-
gent in Virginia, 51 Va. L. Rev. 163(1965). The Legal 
Aid Society is used in some of the larger cities such 
as Norfolk with its Tidewater Legal Aid Society, and 
the Public Defender System is authorized in certain 
counties with very high population density, but ap-
parently this authorization has not been employed. 
The Legal Aid Society is a private organization funded 
predominantly from private sources, whereas a Public 
Defender System is an official organ of government 
staffed by lawyers whose salary is paid from public 
funds. The Court Appointed or . . . assigned 
counsel system consists . .. of the appointment of  
individual attorneys to represent indigent (criminal) 
defendants on a case-by-case basis." (Id. at 176) 
" . . . Virginia and the vast majority of states have 
relied on the assigned (court appointed) counsel sys-
tem to provide representation for indigents." (Id. at 
175). Although the Court Appointed Counsel system 
perhaps locks the efficiency and specialized expertise 
of the Public Defender system, it more than compen-
sates by its virtues of simplicity, minimum organiza-
tion, individual treatment for each client, and lock 
of potential suspicion possible where the public de-
fender works for the government. 
Until 1963 the Sixth Amendment was not inter-
preted as compelling the states to provide counsel in 
non-capital cases for those unable to afford private 
counsel. That year in Gideon v. Wainwright the United 
States Supreme Court held that in all cases in which 
a felony is charged the state must provide counsel if 
the defendant is financially incapable of providing 
his own. 
As early as 1940 the Virginia Supreme Court of 
Appeals held that " . . . courts of record having 
criminal jurisdiction possess the inherent authority, 
independent of statute, to appoint counsel to defend 
paupers . . . charged with crime." (Watkins v. 
Commonwealth, 174 Va. 518 at 522, (1940)). The 
Virginia Code is now explicit in requiring that in all 
cases involving felony charges the defendant be rep- 
resented at "every stage of the proceeding . . . 
before any court . . " (including preliminary hear-
ings before courts not of record to determine whether 
there is probable cause prerequisite to certifying the 
case to a grand jury). The Code further provides that, 
once appointed, counsel " . . . shall represent de-
fendant until relieved (by the court appointing him) 
or replaced in a manner prescribed by law. ' (Va. 
Code sec. 19.1-241.1 (1966)). 
So zealous has the Virginia high court been in im-
plementing Gideon that in 1965 it held that " . . . 
failure to appoint counsel to assist an indigent de-
fendant in making an appeal from conviction is a 
denial of the equal protection of the laws and due 
process guaranteed him under the Federal Constitu-
tion and the Virginia Bill of Rights." (Cabaniss v. 
Cunningham, 206 Va. 330, (1965)), and in 1968 it 
held that a defendant's confession to a felony ob-
tained without advising him of his right to a court 
appointed counsel prior to questioning was not admis-
sible in evidence. (Cardwell v. Commonwealth, 219 
Va. 68, (1968)). 
The Code of Virginia provides that all who are 
charged with a felony must first "be brought before" 
a judge of a court not of record where the judge must 
inform the accused of his right to counsel and boil 
amount, after which the accused is given a reasonable 
time to hire his own lawyer or execute an affidavit 
that he is too poor to afford a lawyer. (Va. Code secs. 
19.1-241.2, 241.3 (1966)). Prior to executing the af-
fidavit of indigency the accused will face an oral 
examination by the judge who will use the information 
thereby obtained and "other competent evidence" to 
determine whether defendant is indigent "within the 
contemplation of law" (a rather vaguely defined 
standard). If the court finds the accused indigent, it 
then requires him to execute a statement under oath 
that he ' . . . is without means to employ counsel of 
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(his) own choosing . . . . a thorough investigation 
(into the accused's financial status) is seldom . . 
conducted . . . (but) his statement (of indigency) 
is sometimes checked with information known to or 
easily obtainable by the commonwealth attorney, the 
arresting officer, or any other official connected with 
the case." (Manson, 51 Va. L. Rev. 163 at 165.) 
Attorneys are customarily appointed in this area 
orally by the judge from a list of attorneys known by 
him to be willing to serve. Attorneys are not required 
by statute to accept appointment, but it is generally 
felt that a lawyer's position as an officer of the court 
obligates him to accept such appointments as a mat-
ter of judicial ethics. Continuances will be given if 
the court appointed counsel needs unexpected addi-
tional time to properly prepare for trial. (Va. Code 
sec. 19.1-241.4 (1964)). Counsel is usually selected 
in this area on the basis of the compatibility of his 
known attitudes with the nature of the charge and 
the age of the defendant as well as upon the basis of 
the kind and amount of his trial experience. Thus 
when possible, no attorney, say, who is known to have 
a "hard-nosed" attitude towards drug offenders would 
be assigned to defend a minor accused of trafficking 
in narcotics. The importance of establishing rapport 
between minor defendants and their parents and the 
court appointed counsel cannot be over emphasized. 
A major problem with the system of appointed 
counsel is inadequate pay for services rendered. Coun-
sel is authorized compensation for representing one 
charged with a felony at a preliminary hearing in a 
court not of record in an amount set by the judge  
thereof, but not to exceed $75.00. (Va. Code sec. 
19.1-241.5 (1968)). This inadequate limit is some-
what alleviated where, in the usual case, counsel con-
tinues his services in a court of record, When the 
statutory maximum punishment authorized for the 
charge is death or confinement in the penitentiary for 
in excess of twenty years, the court may allow counsel 
up to $400.00 and for the defense in case of a lesser 
felony up to $200.00. The court will also direct pay-
ment of reasonable expenses incurred by counsel ap-
propriate to the circumstances with the defendant 
being liable to reimburse all amounts disbursed for 
his defense to the Commonwealth if he is convicted. 
(Va. Code sec. 14.1-184). 
The shocking inadequacy of representation that 
plagued the New York Thomas case would be unlike-
ly to occur in this area. By local practice the judge 
asks counsel in open court prior to conclusion of the 
case how many times and how long he has met with 
the accused as well as how much time counsel has 
spent in preparing the defense. The judge then asks 
the accused the same first two questions as well as 
whether counsel has advised the accused of accused's 
right to waive preliminary hearing, to remain silent, 
and to call witnesses. The accused is then asked 
whether he is satisfied with current counsel and 
whether there is any reason why the case cannot pro-
ceed. The answers to all of these questions are filed 
to be readily available should the accused later ask 
that his conviction be overturned by writ of habeas 
corpus on the ground of inadequate representation of 
counsel. 
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Alumni News 
The Colonial Lawyer is pleased to introduce the 
addition of Alumni News with this issue. With the 
improvements and growth at Marshall-Wythe, there 
has been on increase in alumni interest. To satisfy 
such encouraging interest and to supplement the 
periodic coverage in Alumni Briefs, this column will 
be expanded in future Colonial Lawyer issues. 
Class of '52 
Boyd, Davis and Payne is the new firm name for 
Robert F. Boyd. His address is Suite 1240, Virginia 
National Bank Building, One Commercial Place, 
Norfolk, Virginia 23510. 
Wilson 0. Edmonds' new mailing address is P. 0. 
Box 328, Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830. 
Class of '61 
John M. Court is now serving as Assistant County 
Solicitor for Ann Arundul County, Maryland, while 
continuing his private practice in Maryland and Vir-
ginia. 
Class of '62 
W. Kendall Lipscomb is legal counsel for and one 
of the founders and directors of "The Colonial Bank" 
in Providence Forge, Virginia. 
Class of '64 
Richard E. Crouch is associated with the firm of 
Wells and Hodgson with offices at 2001 Jefferson 
Davis Highway, Arlington, Virginia. 
Hugh Scott Hester's new address is P. 0. Box 355, 
Reidsville, North Carolina 27320. 
Class of '65 
L. Barry Hill is practicing law in Sudbury, Massa-
chusetts. He is serving his third term as Treasurer of 
Sudbury Water District and also is acting as President 
of the Sudbury Rotary Club. 
Class of '66 
Lloyd C. Sullenberger is now a member of the firm 
of Shackelford and Robertson, Attorneys at Law. 
Class of '67 
The new office address for William C. Atack is 
Baltimore Law Reform Unit, 412 North Bond Street, 
Baltimore, Maryland 21231. 
Class of '68 
Robert A. Handel is a partner in the firm of Kam-
berg, Bermant and Handel, located at 31 Elm Street, 
Springfield, Massachusetts. Bob is also President of 
Legal Computer Services, Inc., in Springfield. 
Sal J. Jesuele is a partner in the firm of Oliva, 
Dawdell and Jesuele in Fort Lee, New Jersey. Sal is a 
former member of the Fort Lee Board of Adjustment 
and Appeals and in addition to coaching the Fort Lee 
Junior Football League, is presently a trustee for the 
Fort Lee Board of Education and a member of the 
Fort Lee Environmental Protection Committee. 
Russell A. Kimes, Jr., is a Captain and Assistant 
Staff Judge Advocate at Plottsburg AFB. His present 
address is 908B Nevada Circle, Plattsburg AFB, New 
York 12903. 
Class of '69 
James 0. Kemper, Jr., is Captain in the Judge Ad-
vocate General's Corps at P. 0. Box 695, Selfridge 
AFB, Michigan 48405. Jim will go to a new duty sta-
tion in Vietnam in October. 
Robert A. Lawman has opened his law office in 
First and Merchant's Bank Building in Radford, Vir-
ginia. 
Another class member in the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral's Corps is Christopher Sutton who is on duty with 
the 164th Aviation Group in South Vietnam. 
Class of '70 
Anthony Gaeta, Jr., presently Assistant Transpor-
tation School Brigade Legal Officer at Fort Eustis, 
Virginia, willjoin the New York City law firm of 
Simpson, Thacker and Bartlett in August, 1972. 
Walter B. Golden Ill is now an associate with 
Thomas J. Rathrock, Attorney and Counsellor at Law, 
with offices at 9701 Main Street, P. 0. Box 325, 
Fairfax, Virginia 22030. 
Richard G. Poinsett's new address is 14508 Lanica 
Circle, Chantilly, Virginia 22021. 
John J. Sabourin, Jr., now lives at 10317 Compton 
Road, Apt. 603, Corpus Christi, Texas 78418. 
William L Scott, Jr., is now associated with Swayze, 
Parris, Cowlus and Tydings at 4085 Chain Bridge 
Road, Fairfax, Virginia 22030. 
Class of '71 
Nicholas J. DeRoma is living now at 256-D Wil-
liamsburg East Apartments, Rt. 143, Williamsburg, 
Virginia 23185. 
There are certainly other address changes, new 
firm associations, civic achievements, and elected 
positions not mentioned here that would interest your 
fellow alumni. Please let us know at: 
The Colonial Lawyer 
Thomas W. Wright, Alumni News Editor 
Marshall-Wythe School of Law 
College of William and Mary 
Williamsburg, Virginia 23185 
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